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The initial motivation of this research was to develop a better understanding of the
primary causes of democratic backsliding, and by extension, how pro-democratic governments,
NGOs, and other institutions can most effectively combat democratic backsliding. Previous
research has examined the effects of economic conditions (Waldner and Lust 2018) as well as
populism (Kyle and Mounk 2018) on a country’s democracy, but to my knowledge, no study has
examined whether the effect of economic conditions on a country’s democracy differs between
populist and non-populist countries. My research attempts to provide an answer to this question
by examining how personal wealth, price instability, and income inequality have influenced
democratic backsliding under populist and non-populist leaders globally since 1990. The most
noteworthy finding of my research is that, in contradiction to previous decades’ research,
increased personal wealth corresponds with democratic backsliding in all countries over the last
30 years, but substantially more so in those with populist leadership. I also find that price
instability has virtually no effect on a country’s democratic qualities. Lastly, I find that wealth
inequality has a small though statistically insignificant effect on democratic backsliding under
populist leaders and roughly no effect under non-populist leaders.

Introduction
According to Freedom House, 2020 marked the 15th consecutive year that more
countries experienced declines in their democracy than those that experienced gains. (Sarah and
Slipowitz 2021) Similarly, the 2020 Democracy Index shows that roughly 70% of countries saw
declines in their democracy and that the global average democracy score fell to an all-time low
since the Index was created in 2006. (“Democracy Index” 2020) It should be no surprise that
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democratic scholars have become increasingly concerned with what appears to be a new wave of
autocratization. (Lührmann & Lindberg 2019)
At the same time that the world has experienced widespread democratic backsliding,
there has been a significant rise in populist leadership, with a greater number of populist leaders
and parties in power than almost any time in the last 30 years, just five percent lower than the
peak in 2012-2013. (Kyle and Meyer 2020) In 1990, the world had just four populist leaders in
power. Since then, populist leadership has increased roughly fivefold. Many of these populist
leaders have emerged in regions that have already had a long history of populism, such as
Central Europe and South America where populism was confined to at the end of the Cold War.
More interestingly, however, is that populism has since spread globally, with every continent
except Australia containing populist leadership by 2017. Furthermore, populism has not been
restricted to countries with poor democratic institutions and low economic development but has
also spread to countries with strong electoral systems and highly developed economies such as
Japan and the United States.
These facts indicate that further democratic backsliding as well as an increase in populist
leaders globally is likely. As such, it is necessary to gain a stronger understanding of how the
two are related. Although previous research provides some evidence that poor economic
conditions contribute to democratic backsliding, to my knowledge no research has empirically
investigated whether this relationship exists to the same extent under both populist and
non-populist governments.
The answer to this question should be particularly important to organizations such as
USAID, the United Nations, and other organizations that are involved in promoting global
democracy since they would likely benefit by knowing how democracy can most effectively be
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pursued. By understanding whether poor economic conditions affect populist countries’
democracies to the same extent as non-populist countries’ democracies, democracy promotion
organizations should better understand whether they should invest in economic development
programs or if they should instead focus on other important factors connected to democracy.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: First, I will examine the previous literature
on the relationships between economic conditions and democratic backsliding as well as
populism and backsliding. Next, I will discuss why I expect poor economic conditions to be
stronger predictors of backsliding under populist leaders than non-populist leaders. I will then
describe my research design before providing my results. Finally, I will conclude by arguing that
increased personal wealth corresponds with democratic backsliding, but significantly more so
under populist leaders. I will also argue that price stability has no effect on backsliding while
wealth inequality has a small effect on backsliding under populists and no effect under
non-populists.
Literature Review
The observation that economic conditions are linked to democracy was first advanced by
Seymour Lipset in 1959 in his landmark paper "Some Social Requisites of Democracy:
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" which compared various measures of national
wealth between democracies and dictatorships, arguing that economic development leads to
democracy. Since then scholars have debated the importance of various economic measures and
their significance to democracy, both in terms of democratization as well as backsliding. This
literature review will focus primarily on how democracy levels are affected by three different
economic concepts: personal wealth, income inequality, and price instability. Additionally, I will
discuss the literature regarding how populism affects democratic backsliding.
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Studies regarding what I will refer to as “personal wealth” typically employ some
variation of either GDP or income per capita. While some of these studies will refer to increases
of these variables as economic development, the primary concept of interest for the sake of this
paper will be personal wealth: the wealth of a country’s typical citizen.
Przeworski and Limongi provided one of the most significant rebukes to Lipset’s
argument that economic development leads to democracy. (1997) They instead argue that
development has an effect on only backsliding but not democratization. In other words, they find
that only once democracy is established does economic development play a role regarding
democracy levels and that countries with lower levels of economic development are more likely
to backslide. Examining 123 authoritarian regimes between roughly 1950 and 1990, their data
shows that once dictatorships reach a threshold per capita income of roughly $6,000 (in 1985
PPP USD), the regime stabilizes as the country becomes more affluent. As such, the argument
that rising personal wealth corresponded with democratization was only supported when
analyzing countries with income levels below the roughly $6,000 threshold.
Yet, other studies disagree with the notion that economic development has a causal effect
on either democratization or backsliding. Acemoglu et al. (2008) agree that increased income
per capita correlates with democracy levels but argue that the relationship is non-causal.
Through regression analysis, the authors conclude that the correlation that appears in most
studies is due to omitted factors, most likely historical factors. Despite this, the authors provide
two cautionary notes to this conclusion. First, they claim that a causal link between income and
democracy may be present but only when looking at time periods of 100 years or longer.
Second, they claim that there could exist a causal link that is conditional on other characteristics,
but they were unable to find any evidence for what these characteristics may be.
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Some studies have found that a causal effect does exist between economic development
and democracy levels, but the predictive power of this relationship has gradually declined over
the last century. (Bermeo and Yashar 2017) Boix (2011) finds that in 91% of annual
observations of political regimes prior to World War I, whether the country is a democracy can
be accurately predicted just by looking at per capita income. This figure drops to 85% for the
interwar years and to 76% for observations from World War II to the end of the 20th century.
Little research has been conducted on price instability’s effect on democratic backsliding.
Further, to my knowledge, all research on this relationship only examines the effect of inflation.
No attention has been paid to the potential effects of deflation, despite both economic conditions
having the potential to lead to economic instability. (Taylor 2000) The only quantitative research
regarding inflation’s relationship with backsliding specifically studies the effect of inflation on
young democracies. It finds that inflation was more clearly related to democratic backsliding
than most other economic variables. (Kapstein and Converse 2008) They find that in 74% of
observed democratic reversals, inflation in the first five years of democracy was significantly
higher than in the five years prior to democratization. Interestingly, however, they find that
hyperinflation has a lower association with backsliding than less extreme levels of inflation.
Only 25% of hyperinflation cases led to democratic reversals while 43% of countries with
inflation levels less than 100 percent led to democratic reversals, perhaps indicating that inflation
contributes to backsliding but that the marginal effect decreases after a certain point.
Scholars have found differing results regarding the impact of income inequality on
democracy levels. Boix and Stokes (2003) find that income equality promotes democratization
and prevents backsliding. Additionally, they argue that in highly unequal and undeveloped
societies the probability of democratic reversal in any given year is 20%. They explain that the
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reason for this is that as equality increases (along with economic diversification) that the threat
of authoritarianism decreases, likely because the incentive to exert authoritarian rule decreases as
well. More recent research agrees that equality helps democratic consolidation but argues that in
non-democracies inequality either has no effect on democracy levels or or even weakly promotes
democratization. (Houle 2009)
Ross Burkhart (1997) argues that the mixed results described in the previously mentioned
studies and others are attributed to the fact that the relationship between income inequality and
democracy levels is nonlinear. Instead, Burkhart explains that income inequality and democracy
have an inverted parabolic relationship. At low levels of inequality, increases in inequality result
in increased democracy. Burkhart argues that this is because democracy and capitalism often
operate together, and capitalism tends to distribute capital unequally. At a certain point,
however, the marginal benefit of inequality on democracy diminishes and further
democratization begins to require decreased inequality.
Scholars have paid increasing attention to the effects of populism, especially on
democracy, as the number of populists in power has increased dramatically over the last 30
years. Kyle and Mounk provide strong evidence that populist leadership is much more likely to
result in democratic backsliding than non-populist leadership. (2018) More specifically, they find
that 23 percent of populists cause significant levels of democratic backsliding compared to just 6
percent of non-populists. Furthermore, they find that populist erode various democratic
institutions including both individual rights as well as electoral institutions. The authors employ
a very simple definition of a populist in studying the effects of populism on backsliding in order
to remove as much subjectivity as possible. Their definition of a populist is a leader who meets
two conditions: “First, [they claim that the true] people are locked into conflict with outsiders.
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Second, [they claim] that nothing should constrain the will of the true people.” Most other
scholars are in agreement that populist leaders are more likely to correspond with democratic
backsliding than non-populist leaders. (Norris 2017; Bauer and Becker 2020)
Overall, the literature is consistent that populism corresponds with backsliding.
However, regarding the effects of personal wealth, price instability, and income inequality, the
literature is much less clear despite the abundance of research that has been conducted on the
economic predictors of democracy levels. To my knowledge, there has been no research
whatsoever on how economic conditions might affect democracy differently under populist and
non-populist leaders.

Hypothesis
In response to the question of whether economic conditions play the same role in
democratic backsliding under populist and non-populists leaders, I hypothesize that poor
economic conditions will result in greater backsliding under populists leaders than non-populist
leaders. The reason for this is that because populists are defined by their emphasis on an
“insider” group and an “outsider” group, the difference between these two groups will be more
salient to a country’s citizens. In the presence of poor economic conditions, a populist leader
will be more easily able to justify the dismantling of democratic institutions by blaming an
outsider group. If a populist can argue that an outsider group is responsible for the current
economic conditions, they will be more likely to persuade the “insider” group to support the
dismantling of democratic institutions that allowed that “outsider” group to exercise power in the
first place, even if that means that the “insider” group has their own power restricted. I expect
this effect to occur across different conceptions of democracy. For example, if a member of the
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outsider group holds elected office, a populist could justify restrictions on the country’s electoral
system since it allows the outsider who is allegedly responsible for the poor economic conditions
to hold power. Similarly, if a member of the outsider group writes in a newspaper that supports
economic views counter to those of the insider group, a populist would likely be more successful
than a non-populist in limiting freedom of the press by emphasizing the difference between the
insider and outsider groups.
Data and Design
To compare the effect of economic conditions on democratic change for populists versus
non-populists, I ran a total of 4 regressions using RStudio and a dataset of over 5,700
country-year observations. I will now describe each of the variables that I used in these
regression analyses before detailing my results.
V-Dem Institute Democracy Data
To measure democratic backsliding, I use data from the Varieties of Democracy indices
from the V-Dem Institute. I chose The V-Dem Institute as my source for democracy data since it
is widely considered among the most comprehensive sources with over 3,500 country experts
involved (“V-Dem Project”). Their database utilizes 470 indicators and contains data on 202
polities dating back to the 18th century to create 5 democracy indices. I use 2 of these indices,
their electoral democracy and liberal democracy indices, as I expected that these measures of
democracy were most relevant to the relationship between economic variables and democratic
backsliding under populist versus non-populist leaders.
The V-Dem Institute considers electoral democracy to embody the following core values:
1. Rulers are responsive to citizens
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2. Suffrage is extensive
3. Rulers achieve power through fair elections
4. Political and civil organizations can operate freely
5. Freedom of expression is protected
6. An independent media is capable of providing significant alternative perspectives
(“Codebook - V-Dem” 2021)
Meanwhile, The V-Dem Institute judges the quality of a liberal democracy by the limits
imposed on its government, emphasizing the protection of individuals and minorities against the
tyranny of the state as well as the majority. The V-Dem Institute considers the strength of a
country’s electoral democracy in evaluating its liberal democracy as a strong electoral system is
considered necessary in protecting individual and minority rights. (“Codebook - V-Dem” 2021)
Other important considerations include constitutional rights, checks and balances, an
independent judiciary, and strong rule of law.
The liberal democracy and electoral democracy indices are provided on a 0 to 1 interval
scale, with 0 representing a weak democracy and 1 representing a strong democracy. My
research incorporates both the electoral and liberal democracy indices dating back to 1990 for
154 countries. The Populism in Power database that I used as my source of populist leaders as
well as much of the economic data that I collected from The World Bank begins at the year 1990.
The year 1990 serves as a useful starting point as it is theorized that the collapse of communism,
which had previously distracted from nationalist views, prompted a renewed interest in
populism. (Canovan 2004) Additionally, technological innovation and increased globalization
since the 1990s may have affected the relationship between economic conditions and democratic
backsliding.

Winter 11
I calculate the dependent variable, the change in either the liberal or electoral democracy
scores, as the percent change in the current year's score from the previous year. Possible values
range from -100 to 100, with negative values indicating backsliding and positive values
indicating democratization. The annual percent change in the democracy score of each index
serves as my dependent variable. This method of examining democratic change in any single
year may be flawed because democratic changes may lag the economic conditions that motivate
them. However, I would still expect the relationship between economic conditions and shifts in
democratic levels to be apparent when looking at 154 countries across 30 years.

Populism Data
My data for populist leaders comes from the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
database. (Kyle and Meyer 2020) The database defines populists as leaders who emphasize two
essential claims: “First, [they claim that the true] people are locked into conflict with outsiders.
Second, [they claim] that nothing should constrain the will of the true people.” (Kyle and
Gultchin 2018) Rather than viewing politics as a debate between those of differing policy
viewpoints, populists promote a conception of politics defined by a morally superior class of
“insiders'' that are inherently opposed to some form of “outsiders.”
It would be wrong to suggest that a database of this type does not contain a strong degree
of subjectivity; however, the simplistic definition of populism that the database employs is useful
in minimizing the subjectivity by which leaders are defined as populists or non-populists. After
the database was created, it was sent to several experts on populism “to verify both whether the
leaders from their region of expertise met their understanding of populism and whether there
were any additional leaders whom we may have missed.” Other than subjectivity, another
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potential issue with the database is that populism is defined as a binary variable, providing no
indication of the extent of a leader’s populism.

Economic Conditions
I employ three variables to analyze the relationship between populism and democratic
backsliding. These are GDP (PPP) per capita, price instability, and the Gini Index. I also
attempted to incorporate unemployment rates, but this variable was not used as it had little
significance and weakened the regressions overall.
GDP (PPP) per capita is a measure of gross domestic product adjusted for purchasing
power and divided by the number of citizens in that country. The purpose of this metric was to
serve as a proxy for the wealth of a typical citizen. Some metric for median income likely would
have been measuring typical wealth, but this data was much less common and using it would
have forced me to significantly restrict my sample size. GDP (PPP) per capita may be a flawed
variable to use because it is an average value, meaning that in countries with high levels of
inequality the measure will be a poor indicator of the median citizen’s wealth. Ultimately, I
chose to accept this flaw in order to maximize my number of observations. Data was collected
from The World Bank. (“GDP per Capita, PPP” 2020) Regressions were run using both raw
values, growth values, and log values. Log values are used for my final regressions since they
allow economic values that tend to experience exponential growth to fit into a linear model.
Additionally, they showed the highest levels of significance of the three transformations.
I collected price instability data from the International Monetary Fund which reports
government data on the annual price change of a basket of consumer goods. (“Inflation Rate”
2022, Oner) I ran a variety of models to test for the best fit including raw inflation values,
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absolute values of inflation, and the absolute value of the difference from 2 percent inflation.
The purpose of using absolute values is that both high levels of inflation and deflation should be
expected to cause economic instability, and thus create poor economic conditions that may affect
democracy levels. (Taylor 2000) The purpose of using the difference from 2 percent inflation
rather than 0 percent is that a 2 percent inflation rate is often viewed as a better inflation target
for maximizing employment and maintaining price stability. (“Federal Reserve Aim” 2020)
Therefore, the larger the difference is from 2 percent inflation, whether this is positive or
negative, the worse we should expect economic conditions to be. Ultimately, I decided to
examine price instability in terms of the difference from the 2% inflation target as it provided the
best fit for my model.
Lastly, the Gini index was used to understand how income inequality factored into the
relationship between populist leadership and democratic backsliding. Data was collected from
The World Bank. (“Gini Index Estimates”) Gini values provide a summary of how equally
income is distributed, with 0 representing perfect income equality and 100 representing perfect
income inequality. (“Gini Index” 2021) Regressions were run using raw Gini index values.

Control Variables
Three control variables were used to strengthen the model. These were the previous
year’s democracy score (either liberal or electoral dependending on the regression), corruption,
and ethnic fractionalization.
I used the current liberal democracy score for regressions regarding liberal democratic
change and the electoral democracy score for those regarding electoral democratic change. The
purpose of these scores was to serve as a proxy for the strength of a country’s democracy. I
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might expect that countries with an already strong democracy would be more resistant to
democratic backsliding under a populist leader. However, I might also expect that countries with
weak democracies will have more room to improve, and thus may experience more
democratization under the right conditions. Including the current democracy score for each
respective regression is an attempt to control for both potential expectations. These variables use
the previously mentioned data from the V-Dem Institute.
The corruption variable controls for democratic change that occurs due to government
corruption rather than economic conditions. I would expect that this variable serves both as an
indicator of corruption but also the perception of corruption which may lead the public to be less
resistant to electoral democratic backsliding of a government it views as corrupt. Because strong
electoral systems are expected to protect individual and minority rights (“Codebook - V-Dem”
2021), electoral backsliding will likely correspond with liberal backsliding as well. For this
reason, I have included a variable from the V-Dem Institute’s democracy dataset called “regime
corruption” which incorporates indicators for executive embezzlement, executive bribes,
legislative corruption, and judicial corruption. Possible values range from 0 to 1 with 0
representing low corruption and 1 representing high corruption.
Lastly, ethnic fractionalization was used to control for backsliding connected to the ethnic
makeup of a population rather than economic conditions. This is because I might expect higher
backsliding in countries where ethnic differences are very clear, especially under the leadership
of a cultural populist that portrays a significant minority group as an “outsider.” Ethnic
fractionalization data was collected from Harvard Dataverse’s Historical Index of Ethnic
Fractionalization Dataset. (Drazanova 2020) The dataset provides a 0 to 1 value representing the
probability that “two randomly drawn individuals within a country are not from the same ethnic
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group.” This variable increased the significance of other variables in the regression for liberal
democratic change but decreased the significance of other variables in the regression for
electoral democratic change, so I only included the ethnic fractionalization index in the former.
This is not surprising, as the liberal democracy index largely examines the ways in which
minorities are treated, so I would expect ethnic fractionalization to fit into the model of liberal
democracy more so than for electoral democracy. Unfortunately, this data ends with 2013 which
means that its inclusion resulted in the omission of a significant number of observations.
However, using this variable still strengthened the regression for liberal democratic change
overall.

Descriptive Statistics and Difference of Means Testing
Before discussing the regression analyses that I ran using the previously described
variables, I will first discuss how mean variable values differed between populists and
non-populists in all country-year observations since 1990 (Table 1).
The only economic variable out of the three that I studied that was significant at the 95%
confidence level was GDP (PPP). In fact, GDP (PPP) was one of the most significant variables
in my difference of means testing. However, the results contradicted what I expected as well as
literature suggesting that populism often appeals to those who feel “economically vulnerable.”
(Spruyt et al. 2016). Average GDP (PPP) log values were 4.13 for populists and 3.83 for
non-populists observations, which converts to $13,490 and $6,761.
Price instability, in terms of absolute difference from 2% inflation, proved not to be
significant at the 95% confidence level, but the p-value of 0.15 still indicates some significance.
However, both mean values appear to be driven by a small number of extreme outliers. This is
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most obvious when comparing mean values to median values. Inflation for populist observations
averaged 294.62% with a median value of 2.75%, while inflation for non-populist observations
averaged 28.21% with a median value of 2.8%. When ignoring the highest 2.5% of values for
both groups, the mean inflation values are 13.69% for populists and 16.63% for non-populists,
providing even less evidence that the two values are significantly different. However, it is worth
stating that despite populist observations only making up 6.7% of my dataset, 3 of the 4 highest
inflation values were recorded for populists.
Mean Gini values were extremely similar at 38.28 and 38.39 for non-populists. The
p-value for the variable was also the lowest of all the variables that I ran a difference of means
test on.
Ethnic fractionalization was significantly different between populist and non-populist
observations. Mean values were 0.34 and 0.46 for populists and non-populists, respectively.
Again, these values represent the probability that “two randomly drawn individuals within a
country are not from the same ethnic group.” These results are interesting because one might
expect populism to be more likely when ethnic fractionalization increases and thus ethnic tension
increases. However, one may also expect that the larger an ethnic minority group is, the more
difficult it would be for a populist to gain power, particularly if that leader’s brand of populism
emphasizes the ethnic majority. The values shown in this test provide more support for the latter
expectation than the former.
Finally, the means test regarding both previous democracy levels as well as democratic
change provided the most interesting results out of my difference of means tests. Populist
observations had significantly higher mean liberal democratic index scores than non-populist
observations with a mean value of 0.47 compared to 0.39. However, liberal democratic change
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was significantly different between the two groups, with populists averaging 0.91% democratic
backsliding per year while non-populists averaged 0.41% democratization per year.
Results were similar regarding electoral democracy. Populist observations averaged 0.61
for electoral democratic index scores while non-populist observations averaged just 0.50.
Meanwhile, populist observations averaged 0.88% electoral democratic backsliding per year
while non-populists averaged 0.51% democratization.
Table 1:
Mean Variable Values for Populists Versus Non-Populists
and Difference of Means Testing
Variable

Populists

Non-Populists

Significance at 95%
Confidence

GDP (PPP) (Log)

4.13

3.83

✔

Price Instability (Absolute
Difference from 2% Inflation)

294.62

28.21

Gini

38.28

38.39

Corruption

0.48

0.50

Ethnic Fractionalization

0.34

0.46

✔

Liberal Democratic Index Score

0.47

0.39

✔

Electoral Democratic Index Score

0.61

0.50

✔

Liberal Democratic Change

-0.91

0.41

✔

Electoral Democratic Change

-0.88

0.51

✔

Previous literature regarding democratic stability indicates that political institutions and
norms are often “sticky,” or resistant to change. (Kyle and Mounk 2018) As such, the best
predictor of a country’s level of democracy in any one year is that country’s level of democracy
in the previous year. The fact that populist observations report both a higher mean level of
democracy as well as a higher level of democratic backsliding for both types of democracy
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indicates that the concept of sticky institutions may not apply to populist governments to the
same extent as non-populists governments.

Results and Analysis
I will now discuss my results for liberal democratic change (Table 2) then those for
electoral democratic change (Table 3) using the research design I just described.

Liberal Democratic Change
The coefficient for GDP (PPP) is significant and negative for both the populist and
non-populist regressions. The coefficient for the populist regression is much lower than for the
non-populist regressions with a log of -4.30 and -1.04 for populists and non-populists,
respectively. These results suggest that, since 1990, increased personal wealth has led to more
democratic backsliding under both populists and non-populists, but the effect has been much
larger for populists. This is perhaps my research’s most significant finding.
Inflation’s coefficients were positive but extremely small in both cases. However,
inflation was significant for populist observations but not non-populist observations. The small
coefficient and p-value of .41 for non-populists suggests that there is little connection between
inflation and backsliding in non-populist countries. Despite the extremely small coefficient for
the populist regression, the result is extremely significant. This results runs counter to studies
indicating that poor macroeconomic conditions lead to backsliding. However, given that mean
inflation values for both populist and non-populists were not significantly different, along with
my previous demonstration that mean inflation values for populist countries were heavily
influenced by a small number of outliers, I am unsure that inflation would be statistically
significant even for populist countries were these outliers to be removed. While some
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explanation could be made for why GDP (PPP) could lead to democratic backsliding, I am
unable to provide an explanation for how the coefficient for inflation could be positive and
significant. Given that the coefficients are extremely small, I find it much more likely that the
significance seen in the two populist regressions are driven by a small number of outliers.
The Gini Index provided mixed and insignificant results between the two regressions. In
the populist regression, an increase in the Gini coefficient (an increase in inequality) corresponds
with a decrease in the level of liberal democracy. Meanwhile, in the non-populist regression, an
increase in the Gini coefficient corresponds with a small increase in liberal democracy. While
these results are insignificant, they do support my hypothesis that wealth inequality will result in
a higher level of backsliding under populist leaders than non-populist leaders.
The control variable corruption results in negative coefficients for both populist and
non-populist regressions. However, corruption is a much stronger predictor of liberal democratic
backsliding under populist governments than non-populist governments with coefficients of
-4.26 and -0.57 respectively. The corruption coefficient for populist governments is the only
significant result out of all 4 regressions. As I will show later, the populist coefficient liberal
democratic backsliding is higher than for electoral backsliding. This is likely because the
methodology for the Liberal Democratic Index score includes the quality of a country’s electoral
democracy as strong electoral institutions provide individuals and minorities an outlet for
exercising power. By this logic, if corruption increases under a government, a justification is
created for weakening the electoral system connected to that government, and this weakening
may diminish individual and minority power thus leading to liberal democratic backsliding.
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Table 2:
Regression Analyses:
Liberal Democratic Change for Populists Versus Non-Populists
Populists

Non-Populists

Variable

Coefficient

P-Value

Coefficient

P-Value

(Intercept)

19.77

0.01 (*)

3.99

0.01 (*)

GDP (PPP) (Log)

-4.30

0.02 (*)

-1.04

0.00 (**)

Inflation (Absolute
Difference from
2%)

0.00

0.00 (***)

0.00

0.41

Gini

-0.01

0.79

0.01

0.37

Corruption

-4.26

0.02 (*)

-0.57

0.35

Ethnic
Fractionalization

-1.96

0.37

0.36

0.46

Liberal
Democratic Index
Score

1.04

0.64

0.62

0.43

Adjusted R Square

0.15

0.01

Ethnic fractionalization was included as a control variable for the liberal democratic
backsliding regressions but not for the electoral democratic backsliding regressions. The reason
for this is that I would expect ethnic fractionalization to be directly related to liberal democracy,
which is largely concerned with minority rights, but not with electoral democracy. Although the
results were statistically insignificant, increased ethnic fractionalization corresponded with
greater liberal democratic backsliding in populist observations than non-populist observations,
In fact, increased ethnic fractionalization in non-populist observations actually corresponds with
democratization. However, this level of democratization under non-populists is much smaller
than the level of backsliding under populists. The fact that ethnic fractionalization corresponds
with backsliding under populists is unsurprising. As ethnic fractionalization increases, the
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salience of ethnic differences also likely increases, providing an opportunity for populists to
justify liberal democratic backsliding, especially in countries with poor ethnic relations.
Finally, my control variable for the previous year’s liberal democracy level is positive
under both populists and non-populists, as I expected, though statistically insignificant. This
indicates that the higher the level of liberal democracy is in the previous year, the more likely
that a country will experience liberal democratization rather than backsliding.
Electoral Democratic Change
Similar to the regressions ran for liberal democratic change, the coefficient for GDP
(PPP) per capita is significant and negative for both the populist and non-populist electoral
democracy regressions. Additionally, both regressions are more significant than their respective
liberal democracy regressions. The GDP (PPP) per capita coefficient is -5.45 for populists and
-1.23 for non-populists, indicating that an increase in personal wealth has a stronger effect on
electoral democratic backsliding than liberal democratic backsliding. Personal wealth appears to
have a much greater effect on electoral democratic backsliding under populists than
non-populists. The fact that the trends seen regarding personal wealth’s contribution to
democratic backsliding is similar across both sets of regressions, along with the strong level of
statistical significance, indicates the validity of these results. As I mentioned earlier, this is likely
the most significant finding in my research as it contradicts decades of research indicating that
increased wealth prevents backsliding and supports democratic stabilization. The results also
provide evidence for the theory that personal wealth has become a weaker predictor of
democratization, with my results showing that for the first time personal wealth has actually
become a predictor of backsliding.
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Like the regressions for liberal democratic backsliding, the Gini Index corresponds with
electoral democratic backsliding for populists and an insignificant and very small level of
democratization for non-populists. The coefficient for populist electoral democratic backsliding
is also insignificant, but is the closest to significance of all four Gini Index regressions with a
p-value of 0.15. The Gini coefficient for electoral democratic backsliding is -0.06 indicates that
a 10% increase in the Gini score corresponds with 0.6% decrease in the level of a country’s
electoral democracy. The coefficient also indicates that wealth inequality is a stronger predictor
of electoral democratic backsliding than liberal democratic backsliding under populist leaders, as
I had expected.
The corruption variable yields statistically insignificant results with p-values of 0.20 for
both the populist and non-populist regressions. However, both regressions have negative
coefficients, as I would expect. Once again, corruption indicates a much stronger effect on
democratic backsliding under populists than non-populists. This is likely because corruption
provides populists the opportunity to justify dismantling electoral institutions by blaming an
“outsider” group for abusing those institutions. The similarities between both sets of regressions
strengthens the corruption variable’s validity.
Lastly, the coefficient for the previous year’s level of electoral democracy is positive for
both populists and non-populists, though the coefficient for populist is roughly ten times higher
than for non-populists. Additionally, of all four regressions, the populist regression for electoral
democratic backsliding provides the only statistically significant result as well as the largest
coefficient by a large extent. Overall, these results suggest that the previous year’s democratic
score matters for all four regressions but matters most for electoral democratic change under
populists.

Winter 23
Table 3:
Regression Analyses:
Electoral Democratic Change for Populists Versus Non-Populists
Populists

Non-Populists

Variable

Coefficient

P-Value

Coefficient

P-Value

(Intercept)

21.95

0.00 (***)

5.19

0.00 (***)

GDP (PPP) Per
Capita

-5.45

0.00 (***)

-1.23

0.00 (***)

Price Instability
(Absolute Difference
from 2%)

0.00

0.01 (**)

0.00

0.63

Gini

-0.06

0.15

0.00

0.74

Corruption

-2.25

0.20

-0.64

0.20

Electoral Democratic
Index Score

5.09

0.01 (**)

0.55

0.39

Adjusted R-Square

0.13

0.01

Robustness Testing
To address potential concerns regarding any multicollinearity of my three economic
variables, I used two methods to test the robustness of my results. First, I ran the regressions for
both liberal and electoral democratic change using only a single economic variable and the
control variables to see how the coefficients and significance levels compare to the regressions
that use all three economic variables together. Table 4 examines how the liberal democratic
regressions differ when testing the economic variables independently versus together while Table
5 examines the electoral democratic regressions. Second, I created two correlation matrices, one
for populists and one for non-populists, to see how all of the variables I included in the
regressions correlated. Table 6 shows the populist correlation matrix and Table 7 shows the
non-populist correlation matrix.
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Overall, the robustness testing did not change the results in any significant way. When
comparing the regressions using a single economic variable versus using all of them together, the
only noteworthy difference is that the coefficient for the Gini variable slightly increases in all
four cases, resulting in the coefficients changing from negative to positive in two of the cases.
However, the original Gini coefficients were already so small in the original regressions that only
a small change was needed for the signs to change. Regarding correlation matrices, none of the
variables are strongly correlated enough to provide significant concern for the results of my
research. Most importantly, the robustness testing did not contradict my results regarding GDP
(PPP) per capita, which were the most significant findings of my research.
Table 4:
Liberal Democracy Regressions:
Economic Variables Tested Independently Versus Together
Populist
(Independently)

Populist
(Together)

Non-Populist
(Independently)

Non-Populist
(Together)

GDP (PPP) Per
Capita

-2.90 (0.03)

-4.3 (0.02)

-0.76 (0.00)

-1.04 (0.00)

Price Instability

0.00 (0.50)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.53)

0.00 (0.41)

Gini

0.06 (0.13)

-0.01 (0.79)

0.02 (0.08)

0.01 (0.37)

Table 5:
Electoral Democracy Regressions:
Economic Variables Tested Independently Versus Together
Populist
(Independently)

Populist
(Together)

Non-Populist
(Independently)

Non-Populist
(Together)

GDP (PPP) Per
Capita

-2.36 (0.01)

-5.45 (0.00)

-0.82 (0.00)

-1.23 (0.00)

Price Instability

0.00 (0.76)

0.00 (0.01)

0.00 (0.51)

0 (0.63)

Gini

0.04 (0.34)

-0.06 (0.15)

0.02 (0.05)

0 (0.74)
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Table 6:
Populist Correlation Matrix
GDP
(PPP)

Price
Instability

Gini

Corruption

Ethnic
Fractionalization

GDP (PPP)
Price Instability

-0.18

Gini

-0.49

0.21

Corruption

-0.46

0.14

0.42

Ethnic
Fractionalization

-0.52

0.12

0.21

0.48

Electoral
Democracy Score

0.44

-0.13

0.06

-0.68

Liberal Democracy
Score

0.5

-0.11

-0.09

-0.75

-0.53

Corruption

Ethnic
Fractionalization

Table 7:
Non-Populist Correlation Matrix
GDP (PPP)

Price
Instability

Gini

GDP (PPP)
Price Instability

-0.07

Gini

-0.42

0.02

Corruption

-0.58

0.05

0.31

Ethnic
Fractionalization

-0.34

0.02

0.31

0.25

Electoral
Democracy Score

0.43

-0.04

-0.17

-0.67

Liberal Democracy
Score

0.52

-0.05

-0.24

-0.25

-0.76
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Conclusion
Democracy has experienced a global decline over the last few decades. 2020 marked the
15th consecutive year that more countries experienced democratic backsliding than
democratization. (Sarah and Slipowitz 2021) Furthermore, the 2020 Democracy Index’s global
average democracy score fell to an all-time low since 2006 when the Index was first created.
Scholars have become increasingly concerned with the widespread reversal of democracy, which
appears to have begun just a few years after the conclusion of the Cold War, a time in which it
was frequently believed that democracy had won in the battle against authoritarianism.
(Lührmann & Lindberg 2019)
Widespread concern regarding the recent trend of global democratic decline has
prompted renewed interest on the causes of backsliding, as well as democratization. Scholars
have studied the economic predictors of democratic change for roughly 70 years, though there is
still widespread debate on how economic conditions affect countries’ democracies. Some
scholars, for example, have argued that personal wealth has a causal relationship with
democratization and backsliding. Others counter that personal wealth only has a causal
relationship with backsliding but not democratization; while more recent research indicates that
there is a causal relationship with democracy levels but that the predictive utility of this
relationship has weakened over time.
Very little research has been conducted regarding the effect of price stability on
democratic levels, though at least one study indicates that increased inflation corresponds with a
higher chance of democratic backsliding in young democracies. A small body of research has
also studied the relationship of income inequality on democratic levels, but no consensus has
been reached. Earlier studies indicate that income inequality promotes democratization and
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prevents backsliding, but more recent research has suggested that equality only helps democratic
stability in countries that have already met a certain threshold level of democratization.
However, the research indicates that in non-democracies inequality either has no effect on
democratic levels or even weakly promotes democratization.
The literature on how populist leadership affects democratic backsliding is much more
consistent with nearly all studies on the subject indicating that populist leaders are more likely to
correspond with democratic backsliding than non-populists leaders. However, to my knowledge,
no research has been conducted regarding whether economic conditions play differing roles on
democratic levels under populists versus non-populists.
This paper sought to fill this gap in the literature by studying how three economic
conditions (personal wealth, price instability, and income inequality) correlated with democratic
change under both types of leaders. To do so, I created a dataset of over 5,700 country-year
observations with economic data on personal wealth, price instability, and income inequality as
well as control variable data for corruption, ethnic fractionalization, and the previous year’s level
of democracy. Using this data, I ran a total of four regressions to see how economic conditions
affect two different measures of democracy under populists and non-populists. These two
measures of democracy were the V-Dem Institute’s indices for liberal democracy and electoral
democracy.
The most significant finding of my research was that increased personal wealth,
measured by the log of GDP (PPP) per capita, corresponded not with democratization, as
previous studies might suggest, but instead democratic backsliding. This result was highly
statistically significant and applied to both populists and non-populists, though the effect was
much stronger for populists. This finding directly contradicts research conducted in previous
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decades indicating that increased personal wealth promotes democratization and/or prevents
backsliding. It also lends some evidence to the notion that the predictive utility of personal
wealth has decreased over time, with my research suggesting that the relationship has now
switched directions. Additionally, the data shows that this relationship is stronger for populists
than non-populists. This finding contradicts my hypothesis that poor economic conditions will
be a greater predictor of backsliding under populists. However, the data does support the notion
that economic conditions do affect democracy levels differently depending on the type of leader
in power, just not in the way that I had expected.
How could it be that increased personal wealth corresponds with democratic backsliding,
and why is it that this effect is stronger under populists? The best way to begin answering this
question is by examining how the last 30 years, which my research examines, differs from the
20th century, which the literature I discussed examines. The most obvious difference would be
the improved technology as well as the public accessibility to this technology that has emerged
since the 1990s, perhaps most notably the internet. Multiple studies have partially attributed the
recent rise of populism to the concentration of internet usage. (Bennett and Seyis 2021; Eksi
2021) Could it be that wealthier countries, with their increased likelihood of high internet usage,
experience greater levels of democratic backsliding because they are more likely to be influenced
online by undemocratic populist leaders? This topic should be of great importance to those that
are interested in both understanding why democracies fail as well as how the global trend of
democratic backsliding can be contained.
My research also examines the way in which price instability and income inequality
affects backsliding, as well as how this relationship differs under populists and non-populist
leaders. First, the results indicate that price instability has little effect on democratic backsliding
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under either type of leader. Second, the results provide some, albeit weak, evidence that
increased income inequality corresponds with backsliding under populists and little to no effect
under non-populists.
I will conclude by discussing two ways that my research could be built on. First,
previous literature indicates that the mechanisms by which democratization occurs may differ
from those by which backsliding occurs. However, because the emphasis of my research was on
determining whether economic conditions affect populist and non-populist countries differently, I
did not study democratization and backsliding independently, and future research may benefit
from doing so. Second, as I discussed earlier, GDP (PPP) per capita may not be the best proxy
for personal wealth, which is the concept I attempted to study. It would likely be beneficial to
examine the relationship between personal wealth and democratic levels by testing different
measures of personal wealth to ensure that the results that I have described are not due to the
potential flaws of using GDP (PPP) per capita.
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